The last post described the Dambana ng Kagitingan – Shrine of Valor – standing atop Mount Samat on the eastern side of the Bataan Peninsula. While most monuments tend to reward victory, sometimes more can be learned in defeat. Most of the defenders here on Bataan were Filipino. Most of those who died here, on the Death March and in the initial stages of the Japanese prison camps were Filipinos. With the surrender on 9 April 1942, the Army of the Philippine Commonwealth ended. It would not be resurrected again until the nation gained independence in 1946. At that time, it transformed into the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Many of the leaders of the new Forces saw prior service in the army of the Commonwealth.
ARMY OF THE COMMONWEALTH TAKES FORM
The Jones Act of 1916 passed by the US Congress represented the first major step in launching the Philippines towards independence. The Commonwealth government, enacted in November 1935, formed the second step. Self-government, already in place, saw the development of the different branches of government – legislative, judicial and executive.
On the mind of the new government was self-defense in an era where Japanese aggression ran rampant in China. A Philippine army was to consist of a small regular contingent of 11,000 men with the main purpose of training another ten reserve divisions – one from each of the ten military districts of the Commonwealth. The reserve force comprised male Filipinos – 400,000 – between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. Attached to this army, a small air force included both bombers and fighter. A small navy of torpedo boats to harass any potential enemy invasion force added, as well. The new force was seen as incapable of aggressive action, to be used for defense only.
At the time, the American Army in the Philippines remained at low levels: Brian Linn puts 1934 figures at 611 officers – almost all American – and 10,543 enlisted men – 4,086 Americans. The Commonwealth Army brought a second defense sector into the competition for scarce funds available during the throes of the Depression (The main reason the US Congress used for pushing the Philippines toward independence – budget).
ENTER THE FIELD MARSHAL
Quezon talked his old friend Douglas MacArthur to return to the Philippines where he served earlier. MacArthur was to take the job of making the Philippine Commonwealth Army into a reality. Given an extravagant salary, MacArthur left the details of creating the new army to his aides Dwight Eisenhower and James Ord. He occasionally visited training camps while they slowly evolved but spent most of the time at home in Manila with his family. Stresses developed between him and his staff, but also between MacArthur and Quezon.
The new army’s creation and planning came from MacArthur with little or no input from the Philippine side. His lack of interaction with Philippine leaders, left him totally dependent upon the support of Quezon.
problems from birth
There was, however, little ability in Washington to support a new army in the islands, let alone support the Regular Army already there. Equipment sent out – what little of it available – comprised of materiel at the end of its useful life. Most of the arms, surplus from World War 1.
MacArthur remained fixated upon the number of men called up for training. He let Quezon and his supporters to pick the upper ranks of the Commonwealth Army. This led to the top dominated by political loyalists who did not necessarily have much background. Initially, the Scouts were not utilized to help create the needed Commonwealth Army cadre to further train the thousands of reservists. The lack of trained teachers combined with lack of equipment and camps where the reservists could actually train did not bode well for the new army’s future in an actual conflict.
The bond between MacArthur and Quezon also started to wane by 1939. The president lost faith in the rosy picture his field marshal painted for him – the rank of field marshal was MacArthur’s idea. Military funding for the Commonwealth Army reduced and relations between the two men became strained.
what is an army to do?
Earlier, one of the ideas entertained by high-ranking American authorities hoped to limit the size of Commonwealth Army to a paramilitary constabulary possibly with limited reservists made available to bring the Manila Bay fortifications up to their war strength of 30,000. The Philippines placing themselves in trust to an international neutrality agreement.
At the same time MacArthur was pushing for a rapid development of a Philippine Commonwealth Army, Washington was also trying to expand the US Regular Army to almost double its size by 1940 of 258,000.
Many in Washington and Manila – besides MacArthur – doubted the ability of a Philippine Army to contribute much to the defense of the islands. MacArthur’s own aides, including Eisenhower, as Linn notes, “admired the enthusiasm and morale of the recruits, but recognized the enormous obstacles they faced – corruption, favoritism, unqualified officers and non-coms, inadequate equipment, no natural defenses, inconsistent financial and political support …
At the beginning of 1940, the Commonwealth Army numbered 109,000, few with more than minimal training, equipped with castoff rifles and artillery, and with insufficient ammunition, transport or supplies.”
WAR IN THE AIR
With the escalation of tensions between Japan and America in 1940, the laissez-faire attitude towards Philippine defense changed. The policy of neglect reversed. Japan’s move to acquire natural resources of southeast Asia became known to Washington and money poured in to try and shore up the flank of such a move by Japan. In July 1941, MacArthur gained a recall from the Philippine government to command all US forces in USAFFE – US Army Forces in the Far East. With new bombers, fighters, a reinforced Regular Army garrison of 19,000 and a mobilized Philippine Commonwealth Army, MacArthur oozed confidence in his ability to hold off the Japanese threat.
At the same time MacArthur became USAFFE commander, President Roosevelt federalized all reserve components, including National Guard and the Commonwealth Army.
READY OR NOT
The Commonwealth Army called up an initial group of 20,000 men to undergo basic training in 1937. Of a potential reserve army of 400,000, by 1939, only 4,800 officers and 109,000 enlisted men had received elements of basic training. A military academy established in Baquio consisted of a corps of 350 men. The academy’s goal, to provide the new army with its needs for basic junior officers. However, much like the American National Army during World War 1, the Commonwealth Army simply did not have enough qualified leaders. That lack forced the army to promote the better conscripts to non-commissioned officer positions. The best of these further promoted to postings as Third Lieutenants.
Mobilization in late 1941 led to chaos. Similar to the situation with the old Austro-Hungarian army, language proved to be difficult to overcome with officers and soldiers unable to understand each other – there are over 100 different languages in the country. Unlike the Austro-Hungarian army whose recruits received basic training including a basic set of commands based upon German, Hungarian or Army Slavic, the Commonwealth Army simply did not have the basic training nor the time to develop the idea of a common language.
The majority of the Philippine conscripted soldiers would go into battle with few weapons, little experience with the weapons they did carry and little ammunition to fire those weapons with.
INITIAL PLANS
MacArthur became caught up in numbers. He saw the numbers of men mobilized while not properly appreciating the level of training nor their lack of equipment. Instead of the old US War Plan Orange 3, MacArthur expanded the mission of the Commonwealth Army to meet and defeat would-be aggressors on the beaches. This meant to spread his force out throughout the islands into a North and South Luzon Force, as well as a separate Visayan-Mindanao command. Men with a few weeks of military training with poor or no artillery support sent up against veteran Japanese forces who had fought for the better part of a decade. Those forces had considerably more support throughout, whether it was artillery or logistical. The successful raid on Clark Field 8 December 1941 ensured air superiority, as well.
The Philippine High Command had also never been enthusiastic about WPO3. Why build an army just to retreat into the jungles of Bataan. Of course, the problem, to proclaim an army created also seemed a bit premature in 1941.
MacArthur told some, if the Japanese could wait until April 1942, the Philippine Commonwealth Army would be strong enough to stop them. If not, they could hold for a while before going down in a blaze of glory. By April 1942, the army would have received a modicum of training to be sure, but equipment problems remained. As did the idea of how far the Philippine government actually wanted to wed itself unconditionally to American needs.
TEST OF WAR
War came before April 1942. The Philippine Commonwealth Army on Luzon was responsible for defending the long length of the principal island of the archipelago. North and South Luzon Forces were separated by well over a hundred miles. The North Force given defense of the Lingayen Gulf and it was here the test came first.
If the Philippine Army had been well-trained and equipped with artillery and some air support, the results may have been different. Without air cover and little artillery, the green troops, many into the army for just a couple of weeks, did little to stop the invasion. The chimera that was the Philippine Army quickly became obvious.
The invasion along the coastline came on 22 December 1942. By Christmas, MacArthur changed his plans from beachhead defense to a retreat to WPO3. The North Force men retreated to Bataan, able to hold the door open long enough to gather in most of the soldiers of the South Force. But since WPO3 had been disregarded earlier, potential defensive positions had yet to be developed. While many of the soldiers made it to Bataan, someone forgot to bring the supplies with which to feed and keep the men’s guns going.
As before during the development of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, MacArthur withdrew, this time to Corregidor making a solo trip across the water for a short visit to his men starving and dying in the jungles of Bataan.
The rest of the campaign is described in the last post. From the observation deck high in the cross on Mount Samat, you can see the topography of the two main USAFFE defensive positions – first, east off Mount Natib, the Abucay line; and second, the Orion-Bagac line which went across the peninsula below the north base of Mount Samat.
DIVISIONS OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH ARMY REMEMBERED ON MOUNT SAMAT
the Regular Divisions
The 1st Regular Division became established in May 1936, the first division in the new Commonwealth Army. This was the only peacetime division serving the Commonwealth. Its main function was to serve as a training cadre for training the reservists.
Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin led the unit from 1938 until the end of August 1941. At that time, the division was gutted helping serve as training cadres for the other ten Reserve Divisions. The division reconstituted gaining new men with almost no training led by – after 18 December 1941 – Brigadier General Fidel Segundo, a graduate of West Point in 1917.
The 1st Regular Division at war
Segundo had been serving as Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy at Baguio. He graduated early the classes of 1942 and 1943, bringing them with him into the new division. He sent the other two classes home as too young – many would emerge as guerillas later in the war. The division went to war with no artillery and minus their 2nd Regiment which remained in Mindanao.
The division was sent to act with the South Luzon Force under Brigadier General George Parker. With Parker, the division retreated to Bataan – Parker would lead II Corps on the eastern half of the peninsula. The division fought on the west side of Bataan for the most part with the I Corps. Heavily involved during the Battle of the Pockets, Segundo was relieved of command as a scapegoat for the Japanese successful initial infiltrations.
The 2nd Regular Division
The 2nd Regular Division comprised itself with Constabulary troops. The three regiments better prepared and equipped than most of the Commonwealth divisions. It was not until early January 1942 the division actually formed. The division fought with I Corps in the west for the most part.
THE RESERVE DIVISIONS
At the start of 1937, the first group of 20,000 to 40,000 men received called ups from the Commonwealth Army for basic military training. A total of 4,800 officers and 104,000 men made up the reserves by the end of 1939. Training camps took place at several camps throughout the islands. Field artillery training took place at Fort Stotsenburg, next to Clark Airfield while coast artillery instruction happened out at Subic Bay. Training received was minimal with equipment lacking. Most soldiers went to war without every firing a weapon in practice.
The Philippine Commonwealth Army went to war in three large groups: Northern Luzon Force under Major General Wainwright had the 11th, 21st and 31st Reserve Divisions; Southern Luzon Force under Brigadier General George Parker included the 1st Regular and 41st, 51st, and 71st Reserve Divisions; the third force was the Visayan-Mindanao Force led by Major General William Sharp with the 61st, 81st and 101st Reserve Divisions. On Bataan, the Northern Force gained a new name, I Corps, while the Southern Force became the heart of the II Corps.
11th AND 21st DIVISIONS
The 11th Division was led by Brigadier General William Brougher who entered the US Army in 1911 after graduating from Mississippi Agricultural and Mechanical College – Mississippi State University, today. He came to the Philippines in October 1939 as a lieutenant colonel with the 57th Infantry Regiment – PS. Promoted to colonel near the end of 1940, he got command of the 11th Division of the Philippine Army in September 1941.
Leading the 21st Division was Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin. He joined the ranks of the Philippine Scouts rising to a commission and later command of the 45th US Infantry Regiment – PS. As a major in the Regular US Army, he resigned to join the new Commonwealth Army in 1936. As a colonel, Capinpin was given command of the 21st Division 18 November 1941 – promoted to brigadier a month later.
Along with the 11th Division, the 21st fought a series of delaying actions from the Lingayen Gulf south to Bataan.
Main USAFFE line – Orion-Bagac – end of January 1942.
Note the 11th is in right sector I Corps while the 21st is just below Mount Samat.
On Bataan, the 21st Division served with the II Corps. They held the ground over which the main Japanese attack came 4 April 1942. With their western flank unprotected by the withdrawal of troops from the 41st Division, the west regiment – the 21st gave way when hit by Japanese tanks following heavy air and artillery bombardments.
As they fell back, their neighbors to the east – the 23rd Regiment – also fell back – and the Japanese infantry had yet to attack. They withdrew from positions along the Pilar-Bogac Road to new position at the base of Mount Samat. When the Japanese attacked, they went around and over the mountain capturing Capinpin’s division command post. Capinpin became the Chief of Constabulary in Jose Laurel’s Japanese-sponsored government. He served with the Philippine Army for a few years after the war.
ferdinand marcos
Another figure from the 21st Division was a young captain by the name of Ferdinand Marcos. As a lieutenant, Marcos gathered up troops to stop a Japanese movement threatening to envelop the left flank of II Corps along the Abucay line on 16 January. His efforts won him a recommend from General Capinpin for a Medal of Honor. His actions saved II Corps to fight another almost three months. In the ensuing campaign, medal paperwork became lost but after hearing the story, two months later Wainwright promoted Marcos to captain by telephone from Corregidor.
Active defense by the 21st Division saved the Abucay line allowing for orderly withdrawal.
Bas- relief at the Colonnades remembers the actions.
Marcos tried to rescue his commander with a shrapnel wound to the stomach for his troubles. The attempt was unsuccessful, but his remnant 21st force put up a very stubborn fight. His successive actions as a guerilla leader may not hold as much water as the future president proclaimed, but his presence on Bataan was solid.
31st AND 41st DIVISIONS
Both the 31st and 41st Divisions escaped action prior to retreating to Bataan. They were led by Clifford Bluemel, a West Pointer from 1909. He was commander of the 45th Regiment-PS in 1941. In the fall, he promoted to Brigadier General, Bluemel took over the 31st.
The division saw action on the west side of II Corps in Bataan. Initially in a reserve role behind Mount Samat, they fought hard and long as the situation on Mount Samat disintegrated. From 6 to 8 April, in his own weakened condition, he scrambled through the jungles trying to salvage a foregone cause. His conduct earned him a DSC in 1946. He would have to survive the Death March and three years of brutal captivity first.
Vicente Lim commanded the 41st Division. The first Filipino to enter West Point graduating part of the Class of 1914. His story told in the Philippine Scout post. A tough and dedicated leader, Lim lead his green troops into their first action as the center division on the Abucay line in the second week of January 1942. They held firm to Japanese attacks, retreating only when the division to their left, the 51st, gave way to flanking attacks. The stubborn defense of the division’s 41st Regiment between 15 to 18 January won the unit a Presidential Unit Citation.
THE END
They fought doggedly on along the Orion-Bagac line through February and March until 3 April. Here on the west side of Mount Samat, they and the 21st Division were focal points of the renewed Japanese offensive. By April, the 41st was considered one of the Philippine Army’s best units. April is dry season, and the lower slopes of Mount Samat were covered by brush, dry bamboo clumps and uncut sugar cane. Into this tinder box, the Japanese used incendiary bombs in addition to the heavy artillery bombardment.
Soon, fire forced the men out of their foxholes while continued artillery shelling killed those who tried to run. A huge hole already existed by the time – 3 pm – the Japanese 65th Brigade attacked, a hole that widened into a two-mile salient by the day’s end. Only one of the division’s three regiments was in any shape to continue the fight.
The Voice of Freedom broadcaster Carlos Romulo remembered meeting Lim the next day as the general tried to hold things together. As Lim smoked a cigar “of rolled guava leaves tied together with a string” they shook hands. “He was haggard and his eyes were sunken … his hair, once so black, had turned gray… his scarecrow body … the embodiment of the Philippine Army on Bataan: ragged, starved, sick to death, beaten back hour after hour – but invincible.”
The men of the 41st came from the area of Luzon south of Manila – Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas and Palawan. Along the Tagaytay Ridge, the men mobilized in August 1941. Presently, next to the town hall in Tagaytay, there is a shrine to the men of the 41st with the walls inscribed to the 6,000 men who served.
51st DIVISION
Albert Jones commanded the 51st Division. Previously, Jones led the 31st Regiment-PS as colonel. Bumped up to brigadier general and tasked with leading the untrained division made of men from the Bicol region of Luzon – the division insignia emblazoned with an outline of Mount Mayon, the dominant volcanic peak of Bicol. The officers however spoke only Tagalog making communication difficult. A part of the South Luzon Force with the 41st Division, the 51st needed to withdraw 250 miles to Manila and make their way around the bay to Bataan – the 41st sited farther to the west close to Batangas only 65 miles. Many of the men became cut off by landings the Japanese made at Lamon Bay on 24 December, about halfway between Manila and Bicol.
The commander of the South Luzon Force, George Parker, detached to get the defenses on Bataan ready and Jones took over command of the force. Withdrawing from the east was long and hard, especially with Wainwright’s lines continually crumbling in the northern Luzon plains. The Southern Force just made it to Bataan before the Japanese closed the door.
51st ON bATAAN
No rest for the weary, Parker put Jones’ 51st Division on the west flank of his now II Corps Abucay line. They had little time to prepare their positions before the Japanese launched their first attacks in Bataan 11-15 January 1942. Hitting the seam between the 51st and 41st Divisions – the 41st was right (east) of their South Force colleagues – leading to the disintegration of the 51st over the next few days.
Lieutenant Colonel Loren Stewart, engineering graduate of the University of Maine 1915, died leading his 51st Regiment while reconnoitering the jungled terrain where the Japanese infiltrated. His body never recovered and listed on the Walls of the Missing at Manila ABMC. His family, today, involved in a lawsuit to possibly identify his body from the remains of unknowns in the cemetery. Stewart’s promotion to colonel awaited his return from his patrol.
COLLAPSE
The Abucay line held up to the initial Japanese attacks until 16 January. Led by Stewart’s regiment, the 51st took the battle to the Japanese at first pushing beyond the line where they began. To their left, the division’s other regiment, the 53rd, was unable to keep up. Taking advantage of the aggressiveness of the 51st, the Japanese attacked both flanks routing that regiment and opening up a hole a mile and a half wide. Luckily for the defenders, the Japanese were slow to follow up their success, not wanting to fall into a similar trap. It was here that Lieutenant Marcos, with some of his 21st troops and stragglers from the 51st, were able to hold the Japanese from advancing further. This led to a successful withdrawal from the Abucay line on 23 January.
The 51st fought in only remnant groups for the rest of the campaign. Their commander, Albert Jones, took over command of I Corps when General Wainwright gained overall command with MacArthur leaving. Promoted to major general, he survived the Death March and three years of captivity.
71st DIVISION
One of the divisions of the North Luzon Force, the 71st Division was led by Brigadier General Clyde Selleck. With but ten weeks of training, tasked with defending the coastline on the east side of the Lingayen Gulf alongside the 11th Divsion, they proved not ready.
Baquio sideline
Fighting on 22 December with the 26th Cavalry-PS – and led by Colonel Clinton Pierce, unlike the well-trained Scouts, the green men of the 71st, barely away from their civilian life, were helpless in front of the invading Japanese. Lieutenant Colonel Donald Vann Bonnett leading the 71st Regiment had a chance to destroy a Japanese regiment coming ashore at San Fernando, but the green troops were not capable of moving quickly allowing the Japanese to consolidate with other landing groups. Bonnett’s men fled into the hills towards Baguio. They would have to make their retreat through the upper reaches of the Cagayan watershed.
Helping the regiment retreat to the hills was Lieutenant William C. Porter. Originally from El Paso, he graduated from the New Mexico State College gaining a commission in May 1940. Promoted to first Lieutenant six months later. Sent off to the 57th Infantry Regiment-PS, from there, given a company command in the 71st – PA. As the regiment withdrew from the coast into the hills towards Baguio, he helped defend a bridge with a .30 caliber rifle. With his rifle, he was able to pick off all the members of a Japanese machine gun nest threatening the retreat. In doing so, he was lauded at home as the “Sergeant York of World War II”.
Porter survived captivity including the sinking of a prison ship he was on – 14 December 1944. He became a rancher back in New Mexico and later the owner of a feed lot in Deming.
the rest of the 71st
The 26th Cavalry had tried to keep the way open for Bonnett’s men. Left in the lurch by the other regiments of the 71st and 11th Divisions, 26th were too few to keep the Japanese from pushing forward towards Rosario. Quick thinking by Major Thomas J. H. Trapnell, a former All-American halfback at West Point – Class of 1927 – stopped the Japanese from pursuit temporarily when he pushed an ambulance onto a bridge, setting it afire. Trapnell survived the war going on to becoming a three-star general. In that position, as advisor to the US mission in Vietnam, he advised President Kennedy against action in that country.
Bonnett, on the other hand, survived the Death March only to be clubbed to death by a guard at Camp O’Donnell. His men rejoined the North Force on 30-31 December to become part of the 11th Division.
The other two regiments of the 71st Division were routed the next day near Sison. Only remnants of the division would fight on Bataan. General Selleck given command along the west coast of Bataan, but during the Battle of the Points, seen not aggressive enough, relieved, and his star taken away – his rank restored after the war.
91st Division
Kept as a reserve unit, the 91st Division soon found its way north to help try and slow the Japanese advance out from the Lingayen Gulf. Their experience similar to other Philippine units, was one of retreat though as part of the North Luzon Force, they were able to delay the Japanese long enough to get much of the South and North Forces onto Luzon.
Their leader was Luther R. Stevens. He had come to the islands in the 1920’s following studies at the University of North Carolina. Becoming a temporary Lieutenant Colonel in the Philippine Constanbulary, he served in the Mindanao & Sula District as commander from 1924 until 1927. The “temporary” title taken away in 1927 when he made Superintendent of the Philippine Constabulary Academy in Baguio. That school would become the Philippine Military Academy in 1935 with the establishment of the Commonwealth Army. In 1929, Stevens went back to Mindanao as Constabulary commander. With the onset of the war, promoted to brigadier general and given the 91st Division.
Pushed off the last holding line in central Luzon, Stevens calmed his men down near Gapan, on 29 December, as he walked among them encouraging them as he went. The line held and Stevens would earn a DSC for his efforts.
The 91st became part of I Corps on Bataan with remnants of the 71st Division absorbed. Stevens survived captivity and after the war retired as a major general.
OTHER PHILIPPINE DIVISIONS REMEMBERED ON MOUNT SAMAT
Three other Philippine Division insignia show up emblazoned on the walls of the Colonnade: the 61st, 81st, and 101st. They fought their battles further south in the Visayan islands and on Mindanao. As ill-trained and poorly equipped as their brothers on Bataan, they would surrender in time, as well. The Visayan-Mindanao Force was led by Brigadier General William Sharp. Sharp, an artilleryman from West Point 1907, moved his command from Cebu to Mindanao in January 1942.
Because of Japanese control of air and sea, each island became independent by March with Sharp in command only on Mindanao. The Japanese landed on Mindanao in a large way in April. They were having their way with Sharp’s troops, but the campaign could have gone on awhile longer. However, General Wainwright sent a message to Sharp ordering him to surrender or the prisoners newly captured on Corregidor were threatened with execution. Sharp surrendered but omitted rosters of new Filipino recruits telling them to go home and bury their weapons. Many would return to the field as guerrilla forces especially under the command of Colonel Wendell Fertig, a civil engineer working in the Philippines before the war.
61st Division
The 61st Division called Panay home. Commanded by Brigadier General Bradford Chynoweth, West Point 1912, the division surrendered when ordered by General Wainwright. Most of the men took to the hills and an extensive guerrilla movement arose on Panay led by the former operations officer – G-3 – for the division, Colonel Macario Peralta, Jr. Chynoweth survived his captivity repatriated at the end of the war.
MINDANAO
Brigadier General Guy Fort served in the Philippine Constabulary for many years following a three-year stint with the 4th US Cavalry Regiment. A colonel in the Constabulary on Mindanao, Fort was a natural for command with the 81st Division. He prepared his men in the Lanao province of Mindanao – northwest region – and fought for several weeks against better equipped Japanese forces. The 81st Division gave a good account of itself only surrendering 27 May 1942 after several orders received by Fort to surrender before then. Fort let his men evaporate into the hills with their weapons where they continued to use them as guerrillas. Fort would become the only American general officer in the war executed – for refusing to cooperate with Japanese attempts to get local guerrillas to surrender in late 1942.
Mindanao was also home to the 101st Division under Brigadier General Joseph Vachon. They fought until 10 May 1942 when Corregidor fell, and Wainwright sent out his order for all forces in the islands to surrender.
OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE COMMONWEATLH ARMY
OFF SHORE PATROL – PN
The first act of the Commonwealth government of the Philippines was to create a defense force. We have seen the Army, but there was also an Air Corps and a Navy. Like the Army, everything was on a ten-year plan. The Navy was to be for coastal defense and was to be comprised of 36 small torpedo boats. The Navy, like the Air Corps, served as a subset of the Army.
The “fleet” comprised of two British-built and one local-built torpedo boat – two torpedo tubes – capable of 41 knot speeds. The Off Shore Patrol – OSP, as part of the Army, became federalized in 1940 serving as part of USAFFE. Two other non-torpedo patrol boats rounded out the squadron.
US Naval Forces on bataan
Operating originally out of Manila harbor, the OSP moved to Sisiman Bay next to Marivelles on the south end of Bataan Peninsula. There, they berthed next to the only part of the US Asiatic Fleet left in the islands after 10 December 1941, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three – MTBRon 3: six Torpedo boats with two tugboats – one used as a tender for the PT-boat, three riverboats formerly used on the Yangtze in China, two minesweepers, one submarine tender – her submarines all gone, and two yachts turned into patrol boats.
future officers of the philippine navy
MTBRon3 has no plaque here at Mount Samat so I will leave their exploits for another post. The OSP consisted of a little over sixty men. Several the officers graduated out of the Naval Academy at Annapolis during the 1930’s. Captain Jose Andrada – Annapolis 1930 – served as commanding officer leading into the war. He left on 4 December to command the Coast Artillery Battalion at Fort Wint at Subic Bay. Captain Enrique Jurado – Annapolis 1934 – took over.
off shore patrol at war
Shortly after war began, the OSP relocated to Bataan from Manila, burning their office building before leaving. Throughout the campaign, the little boats made a menace of themselves taking on Japanese armored barges in the bay and fighting off aircraft. After Bataan fell, they relocated to Corregidor before trying to escape 8 April 1942. Of the five boats, only one – Q-113 Agusan – made it, though many made it off the boats sunk or captured. Of the survivors, several went on to careers in the guerrillas. Captain Jurado sadly died in 1944 on Panay at the hands of a rival guerrilla faction.
Alberto Navarette gained the DSC for his leadership on 17 January 1942 when his boat, Q-111 Luzon and Q-112 Abra (both English Thornycraft) evaded attacks from nine Japanese dive bombers. His award shown up in the bas-relief honoring the little navy. The Q-boats severely damaged at least three of the attackers. Two thirds of the members of the OSP gained the Silver Star by MacArthur in the same month. Several current patrol boats today’s Philippine Navy bear names of the Q-boat captains.
One captain, Santiago Nuval, became Chief of the Navy in the mid 1960’s. Another, Ramon Alcaraz, emigrated to the US because of his criticism of Ferdinand Marcos. A patrol boat was named after him by President Benigno Aquino III in 2012.
AIR CORPS
Japanese aggression in China led the new Philippine Commonwealth’s government in 1936 to produce an army as its first act. Included in that act was a small air force. This force, like the other forces called for in the act, accounted for but a small fraction of that needed – 40 antiquated aircraft manned by 100 pilots, supported by another 500 personnel. All Commonwealth forces were federalized in August 1941 – similar to how National Guard units transferred from State to Federal control. The Commonwealth Air Corps evolved from the previous Philippine Constabulary Air Corps, both commanded by one of the first indigenous pilots, Major Basilio Fernando.
air corps early days
The force concentrated southeast of Manila at Zablan Airfield – today’s site of Camp Emilio Aquinaldo, the headquarters of the Philippine Army. The airfield was first hit by Japanese on 10 December 1941. Five pilots made it up to take on the invaders led by Captain Jesus Villamor. They were flying outdated Boeing P-26’s – one of the first monoplane used by the US. Villamor shot down two planes and two others also went down. Two pilots, with guns jammed, attempted to ram the Japanese bombers but the Peashooters were not fast enough.
The next day, the command moved to Batangas Airfield further to the south. However, the Japanese were quick to react sending 27 bombers escorted by 17 fighters over the new Philippine base. Here, Lieutenant Cesar Basa died on the ground after landing his damaged fighter becoming the first Filipine military aviator to die.
On 13 December, the squadron moved back to Manila at Nichols Airfield – today’s Manila Anoy Aquino International Airport. There were only four remaining P-26’s by now. The following day, the Japanese were back, but only one pilot, Lieutenant Jose Gozar – one of the two who tried to ram the Japanese bombers earlier – was able to get up. For his efforts, Gozar got one unconfirmed kill.
Two days later, both Gozar and Villamor gained DSCs by MacArthur for their efforts along with American B-17 pilot Colin Kelly who thought he had sunk the Japanese battleship Haruna on 9 December 1941 – he actually damage a light cruiser and destroyer with near misses. Kelly’s plane was hit by Zeros on his return to Clark Airfield. Fire blazing, he ordered his crew to bail out while he tried to keep the plane stable. The plane exploded killing him and one other.
on to Bataan – grounded
The Philippine Air Corps, on the other hand destroyed their remaining equipment making their way to Bataan. Villamor made one more well-known flight on 9 February 1942 over the coast of Cavite. Japanese artillery set up in the jungles off the south coast of the Manila Bay to bombard the southern island forts – Drum and Frank. Flying a PT-13 biplane, he took a series of photographs of the area which allowed the Coast Artillery a better idea of where the guns were.
Most of the airmen went into captivity with everyone else from Bataan and Corregidor. Of those who survived, several joined guerilla movements. Villamor escaped to Australia serving as an intelligence officer. He made a well-known trip back to the islands to gain information on Japanese and guerilla movements prior to the American invasion in late 1944.
Major Fernando joined the guerillas returning to service at the war’s end. Sadly, he died in a training accident in the US in 1946, an airfield in Lipas, Batangas named in his honor.
The Philippine Air Force headquarters at Anoy Aquino International Airport sports the name of the diminutive pilot, Jesus Villamor.
NOTE ON SOURCES
Louis Morton The Fall of the Philippines official Army history of the campaign 1953 found online
Online at The Fall of the Philippines-Contents (army.mil)
The Philippine Scout website
Donald Young The Battle of Bataan: A History of the 90 Day Siege and Eventual Surrender of 75,000 Filipino and United States Troops to the Japanese in World War II 1992