1863 saw decisions made in the West and East, decisions eventually proving decisive though at the time, an end to the war still lay deep ahead, hidden in the fogbank of the future.  Federal armies in Virginia started the new year approximately where they had the previous year.  In the West, the Mississippi River returned to Federal control with the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.  Further east, near Chattanooga on the Tennessee-Georgia border, the Confederate Army of Tennessee hung on after their serious setback on Missionary Ridge negated their victory earlier at Chickamauga.  Under General Joseph E. Johnston’s new command, the Confederates dug in atop nearby Rocky Face Mountain barring the way for the soon-to-come Federal push towards Atlanta.

CHANGES

Changes at the top of the food chains occurred in both Federal and Confederate armies.  Ulysses S. Grant started the year as commander of Union armies west of the Appalachians, but by spring, he was in command of all Federal forces – General Henry Halleck further slipping into administrative roles he aspired to.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON

For the Confederacy, all direction still flowed directly from the more hands-on President Jefferson Davis.  A West Pointer, former soldier, senator, and Secretary of War, Davis searched hard for the correct combinations with which the South could hold off further Federal gains.  One of his biggest problems, he finally solved with acceptance of the resignation of Braxton Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee following the defeat at Chattanooga at the end of November 1863.  But in Bragg’s place, running out of high-ranked options, Davis placed Johnston in charge after Robert E. Lee declined to come West.

Johnston and Davis attended West Point about the same time – Davis graduated in 1828, a classmate and friend of both Albert Sidney Johnston and Leonidas Polk.  Joseph E. Johnston – no relation to Albert Sidney – graduated a year later in 1829 along with his friend, Robert E. Lee.  Johnston and Davis had argued with each other – it was usually over the question of rank – from the time Secretary of War Davis rebuffed the suggestion forwarded by Johnston to appoint him to his brevet rank earned during the Mexican War – brevet colonel though his regular army rank still only a captain.

With a change of government administration in 1857, John B. Floyd became Secretary of War.  Floyd came from the same hometown as Johnston – Abingdon, Virginia.  He also was a cousin by marriage.  The new Secretary promoted Johnston to the regular rank of colonel against murmurings of favoritism.  Then, in June 1860, Johnston became a brigadier general taking the position of Quartermaster General of the Army.  Davis, now a senator and member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, favored his classmate Albert Sidney Johnston for the job.

JOHNSTON GOES SOUTH

Joseph Johnston became the highest-ranking Federal officer to resign his commission when Virginia seceded from the United States in the spring of 1861.  He ended up accepting a brigadier general commission with the new Confederate States Army on 14 May.  After playing a crucial role in the initial Confederate victory at First Manassas, he gained a promotion to full general but with three other men outranking him.  From here, the rancor between Davis and Johnston took off.

In command of the main Confederate forces in Virginia, following a retreat from their forward positions at Centreville near Manassas in light of Federal amphibious plans, Davis brought in Lee as his personal military advisor – Davis also got in the habit of issuing direct orders to Johnston’s subordinates.  Lee was convenient when Johnston suffered a wound from artillery fragments during the Battle of Seven Pines during the Peninsular Campaign.  Lee took over while Johnston recovered and never looked back.

OFF TO THE WEST

Recovering, Johnston went west to become the commander of the Department of the West.  Following complaints from commanders within the Army of Tennessee about the overall goings on within that army, Johnston went to interview Bragg knowing he would probably replace Bragg if he gave him a bad review.  Honor did not allow him to, and his report was generally positive.  Lingering problems with Johnston’s wound left Bragg in place. 

Next, he went back west to try and help the forces of Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton whose men were beginning to be bottled up in Vicksburg.  Johnston arrived in Jackson, Mississippi only to learn he had only 6,000 troops on hand to try and stop Grant’s forces marching in that direction.  Retreating, he was also unable to meet up with Pemberton after Grant turned west to defeat Pemberton’s force at Champion Hill forcing them back into Vicksburg.  With the city besieged, Confederate hope hung on Johnston gathering enough men together to break the siege.  He was unsuccessful with Davis commenting that the loss of Vicksburg was due to “a want of provisions inside, and a general outside who would not fight”.

Relations between Davis and Johnston went further down the drain.  But when Bragg resigned after his failure at Chattanooga – bumped upstairs to become Davis’s personal advisor – Davis tried to give the command to William Hardee – senior corps commander – who refused.  Lee did not want to leave Virginia, recommending P. G. T. Beauregard, though he had a bad relationship with Davis too.  Realizing the rancor between the two men, Lee changed his recommendation to Johnston. Very reluctantly, Davis appointed him 27 December 1863.

SHERMAN TAKES OVER

Grant had overseen Federal operations in Chattanooga after the defeat at Chickamauga.  He replaced William Rosecrans with George Thomas as commander of the Army of the Cumberland.  A substantial part of the Army of the Tennessee shifted over from western Tennessee and Mississippi to help reinforce the Cumberlanders.  William T. Sherman, one of Grant’s closest commanders, led this group.

A third group peeled away from the Army of the Potomac.  Lincoln figured if Lee could send James Longstreet’s corps away from Virginia and the Potomac commander, George Meade, was not offensively inclined to take advantage, then the men could find use elsewhere.  The group included the 11^th Corps and the undersized 12^th Corps both under the command of the former Army of the Potomac leader, Joseph Hooker, not a favorite of Sherman’s – and by proxy, not of Grant’s either.

Grant went east at the beginning of March 1864 to become just the second lieutenant general in US history as overall Union commander.  He left Sherman in command of the combined armies in Chattanooga for the upcoming Atlanta Campaign.

THREE ARMIES

Sherman had the benefit of three armies under his command – Army of the Cumberland (now containing the 20^th Corps formerly the 11^th and 12^th Corps all still under Hooker), the Army of the Tennessee under the command of Major General James McPherson, and the Army of the Ohio consisting of the 23^rd Corps under Major General John Schofield with the addition of a cavalry division led by the former cavalry chief of the Army of the Potomac, George Stoneman. 

At the beginning of the spring campaign, Sherman had 98,500 against 50,000 under Johnston.  A major problem Sherman dealt with was the end of the three-year obligation of many of his volunteer units.  Many of those volunteers went home though many re-enlisted.  There was also the draft which brought Sherman’s total to 112,000 by June.  Johnston only got another 15,000 men led from Alabama by Leonidas Polk.

ARMIES ORGANIZE

The Army of Tennessee organized into four corps led by William J. Hardee, John Bell Hood, Leonidas Polk – all lieutenant generals, and Major General Joseph Wheeler with a cavalry corps.  Reinforcements from Alabama would augment the total numbers to around 65,000.

For the Union, the Army of Tennessee brought the 15^th, 16^th and 17^th Corps.  Add Schofield’s 23^rd Corps and the Army of the Cumberland with the 4^th, 14^th, 20^th and a cavalry corps.

At the end of the battles around Chattanooga, Patrick Cleburne’s division stopped the pursuit of Hooker’s men at Ringgold Gap on 27 November 1863.  With only 4,157 men at his disposal, Cleburne used the topography to better use than the Confederate divisions had two days before on Missionary Ridge.  His men held their positions for five hours allowing the rest of the Army of Tennessee to retreat.  That ended the campaigning in 1863.  Johnston set up his defenses along Rocky Face Ridge just west of the town of Dalton in the northwestern corner of Georgia.

OFFENSE?

When Jefferson Davis replaced Bragg with Johnston, he had expected Johnston to go back on the offensive.  The same problems leading Bragg to be unable to follow up his victory at Chickamauga bedeviled Johnston – though Bragg, now Davis’s prime military advisor conveniently forgot about them.  The main problems were logistical and lack of transportation.  Horses, mules, fodder for the animals, wagons there simply was not enough of any of them, let alone not enough artillery, weapons, uniforms, shoes, food, or men.

Longstreet’s corps had long since left the scene marching first up through eastern Tennessee taking part in an unsuccessful siege of Knoxville.  Johnston hoped for Longstreet’s return to bolster his numbers, but that corps of 16,000 men was on its way back to Lee in Virginia.  Polk, early in the year, was watching Sherman, who before Grant departed for Washington, had marched east from Vicksburg with 27,000 men through Jackson to Meridian, Mississippi.  That march – threatening the Confederate port of Mobile – ended with Sherman’s men marching back across Mississippi leaving a wide swath of damage and destruction.  This left Polk free to bring his men east to augment Johnston’s army, though they would not reach the scene until the opening phases of the Atlanta Campaign had ended.

GEORGIAN GIBRALTAR

Rocky Face Ridge is more similar to nearby Lookout Mountain than the lower ridgeline of Missionary Ridge.  The mountain extends seven hundred feet above the valleys on either side, running in a north-south direction for about ten miles.  Two “gaps” – mountain passes – penetrate the summit ridge.  Mill Creek Gap represents the deepest cut in the ridgeline – Interstate 75 and US Highway 41-76 both run through the pass.  About three miles to the south is Dug Gap.  This little pass sits high on the ridgeline at almost 600 feet above the valleys to the east and west.  Steep hillsides limit the areas in which military units could operate.

The ridge blends into the northern ends of two other ridges – Hurricane Mountain and farthest west is Mill Creek Mountain.  Snake Creek Gap separates Mill Creek Mountain from the next ridgeline to the west, Horn Mountain.  Remember, the mountains of northwestern Georgia are arrayed like a washboard, one ridge after another.  The White Oak Mountain-Taylor Ridge complex – Ringgold Gap separates the ridge with White Oak to the north and Taylor Ridge to the south – might have given a better and longer rampart to defend from but it had been given up soon after Missionary Ridge.  Federal forces also already gained Cleveland to the north of Dalton in Tennessee enabling either ridge to be flanked from the north.  At least on Rocky Face Ridge, the Confederates were close to their advance base at Dalton and could more easily respond to threats from the north.

DIVISIONS ALIGN

Johnston’s defenses atop Rocky Face and in Mill Creek Gap were impressive.  Trenches, interlocking zones of fire, a dam system in the Gap forcing Federal movements to become even more limited in choice all.  Three of Johnston’s seven divisions covered Rocky Face Ridge facing to the west.  A.P. Stewart’s division held the Gap with the divisions of William Bate and Benjamin Cheatham covering the Stewart’s flanks.  Patrick Cleburne’s division stayed behind in reserve.

Facing to the north across the Crow Valley, Johnston had the divisions of Carter Stevenson and Thomas Hindman with W. H. T. Walker’s division in reserve.  A 1,400-man brigade of James Cantey on its way from Rome, Georgia, Johnston stopped in Resaca to the south, as a safety measure to guard the rail line to Atlanta.

FEDERAL PLANS

President Davis did not think the Federal government had the resources to push two major offensives at the same time.  His attention focused upon Lee’s army and the immediate threat posed by Grant and George Meade with the Army of the Potomac.  Davis, however, was wrong.  By May, the Federals had amassed enough supplies in Chattanooga to support Sherman’s forces, now numbering 100,000.  Johnston had one army while Sherman had three. 25,000 men of the Army of the Tennessee returned with Sherman and Major General James McPherson by the time the campaign started 4 May.

Confederate cavalry pickets posted upon Tunnel Hill which stands halfway between Ringgold Gap and Rocky Face Ridge fell back before the approach of the Army of the Cumberland.  Sherman did not plan on taking on the Confederates in a direct assault on Rocky Face.  He sent McPherson on a wide march to the west aiming to march around Johnston’s positions to cut off the Confederates at the railhead at Resaca.  He hoped to fix Johnston with divisionary attacks at Mill Creek Gap, Dug Gap and in the Crow Valley, where three infantry divisions, about 13,500 men of Schofield’s Army of the Ohio moved south.

BATTLE BEGINS – DUG GAP

The fighting began 8 May with Federals pushing into Mills Creek Gap from the west and Dug Gap from the south.  Johnston knew his position, while strong had weaknesses.  The main weakness was the terrain which gave strength to the Confederate defenders also hid Union movements.  Johnston’s cavalry commander, Joseph Wheeler, demonstrated similar problems to when he served under Bragg.  He yearned for cavalry battles instead of providing his commander with intelligence as to what the enemy was up to.  Most of the cavalry concentrated to the north at Varnell’s Station.  Word of McPherson’s column only reached Johnston in dribs.  He expected the main Federal attack would come in Crow Valley.  With only so many men, he left Snake Creek Gap undefended though, again, he did have Cantey’s men in Resaca just in case.

On 8 May, Dug Gap became the first official engagement.  Here, men from Hooker’s 20^th Corps – now part of the Army of the Cumberland – tested the Confederate defenses.  Hooker sent the division of John Geary up the mountain.  He deployed about half of his division – the brigade of Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck (a former Prussian officer) and half of Colonel Charles Candy’s brigade – forward up the mountain.  Defending at first were two small Arkansas regiments. But soon other brigades marched up giving the defenders the equivalent of 4 and a half brigades. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out along the craggy mountain crest. Daring Yankees vaulted over rocks and boulders to break the Rebel line.  Ultimately, Confederate reinforcements under the command of General Patrick Cleburne arrived on the scene. They successfully drove the Federals back down the mountainside.

POTATO HILL

The next day, attacks began on Rocky Face Ridge, Mill Creek Gap and in Crow Valley.  The 4^th Corps of O. O. Howard attacked the Rocky Face Ridge to the north side of Mill Creek Gap. The men probed for any weak points though mainly trying to keep Confederate eyes focused on the ridge.  Schofield’s divisions of Henry Judah and Jacob Cox attacked in Crow Valley, about 13,500 men focused upon about 12,400 defenders.  Pushing the Confederate skirmishers back to their main defense line, they occupied their attention until evening.  The brigade of Brigadier General Milo Hascall noted Potato Hill “too strong to be carried without great slaughter”.

confederate side

Confederate defenses on Potato Hill included a thousand-foot long elliptical-shaped trench ten feet below the crest. A connecting trench descended downhill to Poplar Springs Road.  On the north ridge crest was an earthwork for a four-gun battery taken up by Rowan’s Georgia Battery.  This battery resulted from the merging of the 3^rd Maryland Battery with the Stephens Georgia Light Artillery Battery. The battery was named for Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens.  Commanded by Captain John Rowan (formerly with the 3^rd Maryland) all four 12-pounder Napoleon guns captured from the Federals at Chickamauga.  They had a range of 1,500 yards – just under a mile.  They played a significant role in the fight.

Infantry and artillery enjoyed a 270-degree field of fire off Potato Hill.  Brigadier General William Tucker and his Mississippi Brigade – 7^th, 9^th, 10^th, 41^st, 44^th Mississippi regiments and the 9^th Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters defended – about 1,200 men.  Tucker’s brigade was known as the “High Pressure Brigade” from their time fighting at Shiloh under withering fire. 

FEDERAL SIDE

They were tested by four Indiana regiments under Colonel John McQuiston from Brigadier General Alvin Hovey’s division and the brigade of Brigadier General Mahlon Manson – Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee regiments – from Brigadier General Jacob Cox’s division.  Supporting the Federals were the 15^th Indiana Battery commanded by German immigrant Lieutenant Frederick Fout – a Medal of Honor recipient from actions in 1862 at Harpers Ferry.  They were about 800 yards northwest of Potato Hill.  Other batteries firing in rounds included the 1^st Illinois Battery atop Rocky Face Ridge and the 18^th Indiana Battery – Eli Lily’s old battery – which was with McCook’s cavalry.

POPLAR SPRINGS

Slightly to the west of Potato Hill, the Confederate line ran up to the top of Rocky Face Ridge.  Here were the guns of Captain Max van den Corput. 

Corput and his brother, Felix, had emigrated to the Rome, Georgia area with other like-minded Belgians in 1848 hoping to become a new elite in the old South. Most of their compatriots returned to Europe after a couple of years, but the Corputs became members of the community. Corput led a three-gun battery which originated from nearby Floyd County (Rome) – the so-called Cherokee Artillery. They had been overrun earlier in the war at Champion’s Hill and all of their guns had been lost.

The men, themselves, surrendered with the fall of Vicksburg. They were back in action shortly after receiving their paroles, first at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge with four guns now. Here, in the hills above Crow Valley, you can see the gun emplacements for their pieces as they lent support to the brigades of Brigadier General Hugh Mercer and Brigadier General Alfred Cumming as they faced possible attacks from the Federals of Schofield’s Army of the Ohio.

battle at poplar springs

The Federals ‘felt’ the Confederate line first on the Rocky Face Ridge on 8 May with attacks from the brigade of brigadier General John Newton’s division of the 4th Corps. On 9 May, it was Schofield’s turn as he sent three divisions forward to test the Rebel line. Barricades and the artillery batteries – especially on Potato Hill – proved too strong and the fighting died down after about 200 Federal casualties and 130 on the Confederate side. The Rebel position was abandoned on 12 May in response to Federal moves through Snake Creek Gap to the south. Schofield had already moved his men through there on 10 May.

Corput’s battery went on to play a role in the next story in the campaign after the Rocky Face chapter – the battle of Resaca, 14-15 May. The guns would be overrun again and this time the battery would not be reconstituted. Max would go on to a career in architecture in Atlanta after the war.

SNAKE CREEK GAP

This pass between the south end of Rocky Face Ridge and Dug Gap Mountain was the goal of McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee.  Push through here and they could cut off Johnston’s army to the north on Rocky Face.  The 25,000 men pushed through untested on 9 May, but McPherson ran into Canty’s entrenched men in front of Resaca.  Unsure as to how many of the enemy he was facing, McPherson elected to withdraw until he was better aware of what he faced.  In the meantime, men from Polk’s corps began to arrive that night from the west.

Sherman disappointed began to shift his forces near Dalton southward through Snake Creek Gap to try and force the issue, but Johnston matched his moves withdrawing to form a new line in front of Resaca on the north side of the Oostanaula River.

The next phase of the Campaign for Atlanta was on.

The losses in the first phase were under a thousand on each side.  That would change.

BATTLEFIELD TODAY

POTATO HILL

A new pocket park – eleven acres, created recently by Whitfield County, is essentially an over-sized residential lot extending from the road to the top of a small ridge running from the south parallel to Rocky face Ridge and mile to the west. The smaller ridge terminates here at Potato Hill. A trail was created leading to the trenches and an artillery emplacement atop the hill. You cover about 600 yards while switch backing up a couple hundred feet in elevation.

POPLAR SPRINGS BAPTIST CHURCH

The Confederate north flank ran from the top of Rocky Face Ridge along the hills at the north end of Crow Valley – here above the church and cemetery – over the ridge which terminated on Potato Hill to the east. Wander into the woods above the cemetery and you find more trenches and the former artillery emplacement for the guns of Captain Max van den Corput.

From the vantage point here and the explanatory tablet standing next to the church below, the entire northern section of the Rocky Face line becomes evident. One of the locals who is playing a role in trying to preserve the old battlefields here in the County stated that by giving up this line, the South lost the war. It is an impressive piece of geography.

Up atop Rocky Face Ridge to the west, Whitfield County owns parcels atop the ridge where stone walls erected by the soldiers are still in place. Access is difficult, however, though people with the County hope to establish a better connection in the future.

MILL CREEK GAP – GEORGE W. DISNEY TRAIL

Mill Creek Gap was not heavily contested by George Thomas’ men.  They were aware of the technical problems faced with little reward.  Most of any trace of Civil War battles were removed with the construction of Interstate 75 through the Gap.  There is one lone grave atop the ridge on the south side of the Gap discovered by Boy Scouts in 1912 belonging to English-born George W. Disney.  He was a soldier with the 4^th Kentucky Infantry, a regiment of the Kentucky “Orphan” Brigade.  He died from a stray bullet while serving atop Rocky Face in February 1864.  Disney was buried where he fell.

A short steep trail – 1.44 miles with an elevation gain of 728 feet – leads to his grave.  There are good views out over the Gap and the terrain to the west beyond.  Best time of the year is late winter or early spring before the tree begin to obscure the wide-ranging views.  The walk begins in a parking lot on the south side of the Gap off US Highway 41-76 – follow the lane leading to the First Church of the Nazarene.  Walking further on boot paths from the grave will bring you to old ramparts built up during the war.

DUG GAP – PINHOTI TRAIL

Dug Gap Battle Park is located just south of Dug Gap Mountain. The 335-mile Pinhoti Trail goes through Dug Gap Mountain and down into Dalton as it makes its way to the start of the Appalachian Trail at Amicalola falls.  One can walk from here south to Snake Creek Gap where a much larger car park exists.  

Breastworks built by Confederate soldiers during the Atlanta Campaign are still intact for the most part and visible to those who visit Dug Gap Battle Park. The park features a scenic view from the top of Dug Gap Mountain hiking trail that overlooks the Dalton area as well as the Georgia mountains. The park is open Sunday through Saturday during daylight hours only.