Chickamauga was a battle full of high drama at various stages of the long battle. An excellent case concerns the arrival of the Federal Reserve Corps.

Brigadier General John Beatty stood on Snodgrass Hill along with Major General George Thomas looking off to the north.  The Federals chance of holding the line on the afternoon of 20 September 1863 seemed more tenuous by the minute.  “We saw off to our rear the banners and glittering guns of a division coming towards us, and we became agitated by doubt and hope.  Are they friends of foes?”  Still too far off to ascertain exactly, Thomas became agitated as his hand shook, raising his field glass to observe.  “Take my glass, some of you whose horse stands steady – tell me what you can see.” 

Two officers went to check for sure the identity of the newcomers to the party brewing on Horseshoe Ridge.  They waved their hats after the meeting signaling the identity was not foe by friend.  Gordon Granger and his Reserve Corps arrived and Thomas with his remaining Cumberlanders felt relief at the addition of 3,819 Federals attempting to salvage something from a very long day at Chickamauga.

GORDON GRANGER

A member of the West Point Class of 1845, Granger graduated thirty-five out of a class of forty-one. His choice of army postings became limited to the infantry.   Posted to the 2^nd Infantry Regiment in Detroit, Granger transferred the newly constituted Regiment of Mounted Riflemen in 1846.  The Riflemen had organized to provide protection to emigrants along the wagon trails to the West, especially in lieu of the short-lived Cayuse War in the Oregon Territory.  The Mexican War intervened, and the Mounted Riflemen went south to participate as part of Winfield Scott’s expedition taking them to Mexico City eventually.  The Riflemen fought that campaign dismounted.  A hurricane sank the ship carrying most of their mounts.  Granger earned two citations for gallantry during the campaign.

After the war, Granger went first to Oregon with the Riflemen in May 1847 – serving at Fort Vancouver – before moving to the Texas frontier at the end of 1851.  On sick leave at the onset of the Civil War, he served for a short time on George McClellan’s staff in Ohio.  Finally, promoted to captain in May 1861, he returned to the Mounted Riflemen to serve as an adjutant for Major Samuel Sturgis.  Serving as a staff officer to Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson’s Creek, Granger gained another citation for gallantry at that battle 10 August 1861.

FROM CAPTAIN TO GENERAL IN A YEAR

With the war continuing late into 1861, with Winfield Scott gone from overall Federal command, Granger (along with a raft of other Regular Army officers), was freed up to accept the colonelcy of the 2^nd Michigan Cavalry at Benton Barracks in St. Louis.  Scott had allowed officers to join the volunteer ranks before his November 1861 resignation, but those officers making the shift had to resign their commissions in the Regular Army.  To better train the volunteers, McClellan, Scott’s successor, allowed officers to join volunteer units while maintaining their Regular Army ranks.

A man of Regular Army discipline – including punishment, Granger is remembered by some for whipping the men into a force or – and here seems to be the majority – as a martinet.  James Colehour of the 92^nd Illinois Mounted Infantry remembered Granger as “a West Point Dham Phool”.  Granger was far from alone in being regarded poorly by volunteers who did not sign up for by-the-book army discipline.

Joining up with John Pope’s Army of the Mississippi, Granger gained a brigade command with the addition of the 3^rd Michigan and the 7^th Illinois which would reform into the Cavalry Division.  He commanded the division during the Battle of New Madrid and Island Number 10 and farther into the Siege of Corinth.  Promoted to major general of volunteers on 17 September 1862 he took command of the Army of Kentucky which would eventually become the Reserve Corps of the Army of the Cumberland.

RESERVE CORPS

The Reserve Corps consisted of mostly troops strung out along the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad line and garrisons such as Nashville.  This constituted the lifeline for William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the Tullahoma Campaign of the summer of 1863 and beyond.  With the Reserve Corps, a lot of staff work before running through Rosecrans’ staff became the task of Granger.  Originally, the command was not intended to join the combat forces but to run as an administrative unit only.

During the Tullahoma Campaign, Rosecrans brought units of Granger’s corps forward to guard rear armies allowing the regular forces of the Army of the Cumberland to march on.  As the Tullahoma Campaign turned into the Chickamauga Campaign, the Reserve Corps came forward to guard the possible retreat route for Rosecrans’ army spread out to the south of Chattanooga as Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, reinforced, turned to meet Rosecrans.

RESPONSIBILITIES IN FRONT OF CHICKAMAUGA

Granger’s men main responsibility was to defend the Rossville Gap, a couple miles southeast of Chattanooga.  They spent the moments leading up to the main battle protecting the way for the rest of Rosecrans’ army to reconcentrate at Chattanooga in the face of now-superior Confederate numbers. There were nominally two divisions making up the Reserve Corps under Granger.  The first division had Brigadier James Steedman as commander.  Two brigades made up the division.  Granger’s second division lay back along the railroad and garrison posts to the northwest and Nashville.  One of the brigades was present here led by Colonel Daniel McCook.

Now, not only was Granger not a favorite of the rank and file, his popularity among ither senior officers proved problematic.  Many did not like Granger much because of his tendency to voice strong opinions, especially when he would have better served to simply be quiet.  William Shanks, correspondent with the New York Herald, noted Granger “never disliked a man without showing it.”  James Wilson, a future famous cavalry commander, noted Granger “would do himself more harm by a day of senseless braggadocio than he could repair by a month of irreproachable conduct.” Thomas and Grant were not among Granger’s fans though Rosecrans speaking to Thomas noted, “You think he is a blatherskate, and in one sense he is … but you will find him a great man in battle.”

pRELIMINARY MOVES

During screening operations on 18-19 September at Reed’s Bridge on the main road into Ringgold and the main supply hub for Bragg. McCook, with five regiments decided to knock out the bridge.  He thought in doing so he could isolate a lone Confederate brigade that lost itself on the wrong side of Chickamauga Creek.  McCook also notified General George Thomas of the possibility “one or more brigades had crossed to this side of the creek”.  Wanting to stay on the scene nevertheless, he received orders to recall his men to Rossville by Granger.  At the same time, Thomas began wheeling his men into action, beginning the main portions of the Battle of Chickamauga.

SEPTEMBER 20

For 20 September, Granger had a couple missions given to him by Rosecrans.  First, to hold Rossville Gap.  Second, was to help Thomas if he needed help.  Granger’s three brigades had responsibility spread out over several miles with limited information.  McCook’s command went south to McAfee Church a few miles north of today’s national park headquarters on the main road from Ringgold.  He then brought together his other two brigades – Steedman’s division – forward, one under Colonel John Mitchell and the other under Brigadier General Walter Whitaker. They headed south to the sound of the guns roaring from the direction of Thomas’ men.

“Why the – does Rosecrans keep us here?  There is nothing in front of us.” He asked his chief of Staff Joseph Fullerton.  Pointing in the direction of the roar, “There is the battle!”  Climbing up on top of a hayrick, the two sat and listened for ten minutes – 11am – until finally Granger jumped up exclaiming “I am going to Thomas, orders or no orders!”  After Fullerton warned his boss, “… if you go, it may bring disaster to the army and you to a court-martial.”  Granger relied, “There’s nothing in our front but ragtag bobtail cavalry.  Don’t you see Bragg is piling his whole army on Thomas?  I am going to his assistance.”

FORWARD TO THOMAS

By 11:30, Granger’s two brigades, with Granger and his staff in the lead, headed south.  For his men, Chickamauga would constitute their first real battle.  Whitaker’s brigade was first in line of march.  He had a long history of combat first seasoned at Shiloh leading the 6^th Kentucky.  Pushing off the road at Cloud Church where they pushed by a Confederate cavalry brigade, they pushed off.  With Confederate artillery nearby, Granger led his men onto a quieter country lane running a little to the west of the Lafayette Road bypassing the Confederate guns.  He brought up McCook’s brigade to screen the movements of the other two brigades.  The Confederates on the right flank of Bragg’s main line readied themselves for an attack on their line in the face of Granger’s appearance.

But Granger headed further south to Snodgrass Hill where he met up with Thomas in dramatic fashion.  Thomas position on the hill there was holding, but Confederate reinforcements were coming up to try and capture Horseshoe Ridge, the elongated hill coming off Snodgrass to the west.  Originally, the hope was to fit the Reserve Corps into the hole existing between Thomas’ line at Kelly Field to the east and the hills to the west.  But with the threat to Thomas’ right, the corps went in that direction.

THE RESERVE CORPS IN ACTION

With Steedman in direct command over the two brigades, they would engage in desperate fighting over the next three hours until, almost out of ammunition, the brigades finally withdrew from Horseshoe Ridge.  Their fight stymied the seemingly unstoppable flow of Confederates which James Longstreet had crushed the Federal right with earlier at noon.  Both Steedman and Whitaker suffered wounds early on in the fighting – Steedman falling from his horse and Whitaker knocked from his horse by a bullet which, luckily for him, did not penetrate.  Mitchell would also leave the line for awhile during the fight wounded, as well.

Granger remained with Thomas during the fight.  Thomas stayed on Snodgrass Hill until about 4:30 p.m. when he left to confer about the situation regarding his other line at Kelly Field to the east.  Granger stayed in charge of the Federal right until forced off the field out of ammunition.  Granger’s forces on Horseshoe Ridge that day numbered 3,700 according to Fullerton.  Of those, 1,175 died or fell wounded with another 613 missing – nearly 50% casualties.

GRANGER BEYOND CHICKAMAUGA

Gordon Granger would go onto more adventures as the war dragged on.  Rewarded for his role at Chickamauga, Granger gained command of the IV Corps during the Chattanooga Campaign, and it was his men who carried the day at Missionary Ridge. His performance during the succeeding Knoxville Campaign – Grant already did not like him – ended his career with the Army of the Cumberland. Granger found himself posted to sideshows for the rest of the war.

He ended the war as commander of the Department of Texas where he is famous for his General Order Number 3 officially ending slavery in that state on the “Juneteen” 19 June 1865.  With the war’s end, he returned to the army though bad relations he shared with Ulysses Grant and his Democratic political leanings did not do him much good.  Sent to command the District of New Mexico as the colonel of the 15^th Infantry Regiment, ill health eventually killed him 10 January 1876.

POST-SCRIPT STEEDMAN AND HIS MEN AT CHICKAMAUGA

Steedman and Granger were not the best friends in the Army of the Cumberland.  Granger probably did not have many because of his prickly personality, martinet-like demeanor towards discipline and dishing out punishment to those who ran afoul.  Towards others, especially superiors, he had a sharp tongue. 

In the words of General John C. Smith, who served at Chickamauga as a lieutenant colonel in the 96^th Illinois, one of Steedman’s regiments and a postwar lieutenant governor of Illinois, “That General Granger was a brave man, no one will question, but he had some grave faults which seriously detracted from his usefulness.

General Granger was unpopular in his own Reserve Corps command and an unwelcome visitor at headquarters. To his own subordinates, he was exacting and overbearing while to his superiors he was discourteous. He was forever criticizing the actions of his superiors, caviling at their orders and condemning their movements. For this he was so much disliked that his commanding officers would rather he was not with them. Granger’s criticisms were keen but not always just. No one could detect a weak point in the line or a false move more readily than Granger, but he lacked the genius or ability to strengthen one or to correct the other.”

FORAGING FOR DISCIPLINE

Just days before the battle on Horseshoe Ridge, Granger noticed men coming back to camp after a local foraging expedition.  The men had not been properly supplied with rations for several days due to the number of constant moves the corps was involved in during events leading up to the battle.  Granger had forbidden foraging in his order previously.  Becoming upset, he ordered his escort to arrest every man found outside Steedman’s camp.

The men were brought before Granger who checked them for possible forage found in their possession.  If contraband was found, the men were tied to trees or rails to hold them in place.  With more than 100 men gathered up like this, the order to give each man 25 lashes was given.

INTERVENTION

Steedman and his staff were quietly watching Granger’s tantrum.  Going over to Granger, Steedman suggested reducing the number of lashes to 20 to which Granger responded with profanity.  But Steedman prevailed and the number was reduced.

Having been successful, Steedman then suggested maybe 15 lashes would be enough to get General Granger’s point across to the men.  More profanity followed but Granger relented with the assurance that the men would not be released from their “just” punishment. 

Smith relates the next stage, “General Steedman, who had again seated himself, now arose and buttoning his coat as only a soldier does when going into action, advanced towards his superior officer, saying, ‘General, those soldiers belong to my command; they were under no restrictions as to leaving camp. There were no orders forbidding their foraging, providing they did not molest loyal citizens. They are short of rations and were permitted to do as they have done. They are American soldiers and no man has the right or authority to flog an American soldier. It is in violation of the acts of Congress to flog a soldier and no man can lawfully do so. I tell you, general, that I will use all the force at my command to protect these men and you touch one of them at your peril.’

POSTWAR FEUDS

The interpersonal failure between Steedman and Granger continued after the war.  Granger would never win a public relations battle with Steedman who was a lawyer, politician and newspaper editor back in Toledo, Ohio.   Both men were Democrats which would figure in both of their postwar careers.  Steedman ended the war on very good terms with President Andrew Jackson, also an antebellum Democrat.  There was some thought that if Jackson had been successful in removing Edwin Stanton as Secretary of War, Steedman would have been his replacement.

Garfield’s note

There were already some thoughts as to the veracity of Fullerton’s reporting regarding Granger marching his men to the sounds of the guns without orders. But while maybe there was no hayrick, in fact Brigadier General James Garfield, Rosecrans’ chief of staff, sent a message to Granger on the night of 19 September regarding the Reserve Corps: “Did you receive an order today to bring General Spears up? Let him and General Wagner hold Chattanooga. You must help us in the fight tomorrow by supporting Thomas. What is the news with you? We have repulsed them at nearly every point today, though they have attacked us with superior numbers.” (OR, Serial 52, p. 741).  (Spears and Wagner commanded brigades protecting Chattanooga in the rear of the army.)

Garfield’s note verifies Rosecrans is aware of where the Reserve Corps was.  Granger gained the role to defend Rossville Gap (previously) but now, also to support Thomas on 20 September if needed.  The fact Granger did not receive further orders on the 20^th came about with Rosecrans forced off the field as a result of Longstreet’s attack.  Thomas was likewise occupied with the events surrounding his forces to call for Granger.  Granger was given independence to act on his own.  Fullerton simply adds drama to Granger’s eventual decision.

sides drawn

Adherents of Steedman and Steedman himself totally changed the narrative in the postwar years, however.  Some members of Steedman’s staff created the idea Steedman was not under Granger’s orders.  Further, it was Steedman who made the decision to forget about Rossville Gap and instead march to join Thomas.

A book was written in 1876 by Dr. Joseph Thatcher Woods.  Woods was a physician originally with the 96^th Ohio but later, as a major, served as a division surgeon through the Atlanta Campaign with Steedman. He suggested on the basis of an order sent by Rosecrans directly to Steedman on the 16^th – the order was to send a brigade to perform a reconnaissance towards Ringgold to ascertain what exactly was going on there. 

the doctor writes a book

Woods goes on to suggest Granger was only up close to the front because “he desired to be at the post of danger and glory”.  He then exclaims “the reception of orders by the Division Commander direct from the Commander of the Army certainly presents the extraordinary circumstance of the ignoring of a Corps Commander and his presence without a command, he being compelled to be an idle looker-on at the movements of his own troops.”

Steedman was directed to hold the Ringgold Bridge (Red House Bridge) at all costs after he returned from his recon mission.  “The unrested command immediately retraced its steps, Gen. Granger remaining with his staff and escort solitary and idle military residents of Rossville.”

On the 20^th, it was Steedman who decided to “disobey” his order to hold the Red House Bridge and to march to the sound of the guns.  “Never was bold resolution more wisely taken; never was disobedience more tempered with wisdom, for a terrible drama was speedily drawing to a close with certain disaster to Union forces.” 

who is marching who to the sound of the guns?

As Steedman got his force moving just after 11 am, near the McAfee Church “General Granger unexpectedly rode up with his staff, having just arrived from Rossville.  Saluting his division commander, he promptly inquired, with a fearful decoration of adjectives, what he was doing.  No reply could be more curious than “General Granger, I am going over to the fight that General Thomas is having with the rebels.”  No urbanity of manner or speech could make the announcement less than astounding to Granger, who, utterly amazed, replied with deep earnestness, “General, you have been ordered in writing , by General Rosecrans, to hold Ringgold bridge ‘at all hazards,’ and it is a fearful thing for an officer to disobey an order of the commanding general in the face of the enemy.””

Steedman’s reply was purportedly, “True, Gen. Granger, but the situation is much changed since the issuing of that order, and if the commanding general were here, or knew the facts, he would certainly change it and order me to the field. … There is no enemy in our front, we are doing no good here, and are much needed on the field.”  To which Granger “could only courteously reply, “I know you are right,” with the instinct of a regular officer adding, “but, being with you, I will be censured.”  In response, Steedman answered, “No, General Grange, you shall not be censured.  This is my movement, and I take the whole responsibility for it.”

Granger the “Meek”?

Woods finishes with “The schooled disciplinarian gracefully yielding to the stern logic and stern determination of the volunteer officer, politely responded, “You are right, anyway, General, carry out you purpose and I will sustain you.”  He was, no doubt, proud of the practical worth and pluck of his subordinate, for, mounting his horse, he accompanied him to the field. 

Of course, it is Steedman who presents the men to Thomas when they dramatically arrive on Snodgrass Hill.  Granger notes as Steedman begins to move his men off to the right end of Horseshoe Ridge, “Sted – my old boy,” said he.  “it’s going to be d—d hot in there!” to which it was possible to make only the reply, “Yes, General Granger, it looks so.” 

“The former, in the most feeling manner, continued, “Sted, if anything should happen in the attack you are about to make on the enemy, have you got any requests to make of me?”  The vein of tenderness was surely running rather deep for a man who saw an earthquake ready to swallow him up, and to the feeling and most fitting query the practical soldier replied, without the least glimmer of sentiment, “Yes, General Granger, if I fall in the fight, please see my body decently buried and my name spelled correctly in the newspapers.”  “Is that all?” “Yes, General, that is all,” ended the colloquy.  Not a little disappointed with the peculiar reception of his well-meant, kindly offices, Granger, spurring his horse impetuously, rode away, muttering, “He’s d—d cool, anyhow,” while the stentorian voice of Steedman solved every doubt and drowned every fancy in the stern command – “Forward!””

more granger mishaps

Woods goes on to describe the actions of Steedman and his men before throwing Granger under the bus one more time.  The 22^nd Michigan is marching off the ridge at the end of the battle when General Granger intercepts them.

“The colonel was marching down the slope to the rear, as directed, when General Granger, who knew nothing of the proposed abandonment of the field, chanced to notice him (Colonel Lefever commander of the 22^nd Michigan) and inquired what he was doing, to which Lefever replied that he was obeying the orders of General Steedman to retire, and that he understood the whole line was moving to the rear.  Struck with astonishment … General Granger assured him that it must be a mistake, and directed him to go back to his position, as the field must be held. … It was an unintentional but fatal error, as the instant that Lefever ‘bout faced the 22^nd Michigan, they were on their march to the Andersonville death pen and Libby Prison!”

True or false?  In the mind of James Steedman it was true as he wrote in his preface to Woods’ book:

A PREFACE TO “TRUTHS”

Toledo, Ohio, August 3rd, 1876.

Dr. J. T. Woods:

Dear -Sir, — I have read the manuscript of your little volume entitled ” Steedman and his Men at Chickamauga,” and I beg leave to say to you, that so far as I remember the occurrences of the engagement, it is a full and truthful account of the part taken by my command in that fierce and terrible battle, and is the only statement I have ever seen which does justice to the brave men who saved the command of General George H. Thomas from defeat and probable capture.

Very Respectfully

Your Friend,

James B. Steedman.

ANALYSIS OF MYTHS

Dave Powell, who has written some of the most exhaustive works on Chickamauga, wrote in 2007: “Certainly there is a lot of mythmaking concerning Granger’s arrival. However, I think you have left out a critical element of the equation that does much to explain how all this mythology came to be.

“Just a few years after the war, members of Steedman’s staff began to circulate the idea that Steedman was not under Granger’s orders, and that Steedman made the decision to disregard his current assignment and march to join Thomas. (Their basis for the idea of Steedman’s independence was one order issued directly from Rosecrans to Steedman a few days before, bypassing Granger’s Corps HQ. Very weak, in retrospect.)

“The first intimations of this are probably found in William Shanks’ book, published in 1866 – “Personal Recollections of Distinguished Generals.” Shanks was very sympathetic to Steedman and credited him with a great deal of initiative.

“Of course, these claims drew considerable reaction from Granger Staffers. Fullerton’s piece, which you quoted, was written as a direct refutation of an earlier speech by John C. Smith, in which Smith attributed all of Granger’s discussion of disobeying orders to Steedman and had Granger wringing his hands helplessly on the sidelines. …

“I agree that the idea of the march “against orders” is vastly overdone by popular history. Granger was acting within his orders, and personally I am pretty suspicious of the way the scene is portrayed by either Fullerton or Smith, to name two of the principals involved in the later myth-building.”