Joseph Hooker, the commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, stated before the battle of Chancellorsville, “I have the finest army on the planet. I have the finest army the sun ever shone on. … If the enemy does not run, God help them. May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.” Such braggadocio did not go well with Hooker’s Confederate counterpart, Robert E. Lee. Lee kept a scrapbook of newspaper clippings and was not at all amused by what he read.
MYTHS SWIRLING ABOUT THE MISTS OF TIME
Lack of confidence?
Nor have many historians whether professional or simply online writers. Hooker has been taken to task over the years for a myriad of flaws whether it be womanizing, drinking, or simply losing his nerve at Chancellorsville. According to a news interview with Abner Doubleday, one of Hooker’s division commanders as the Army of Potomac marched north after the battle in the wake of Lee’s second invasion of the North, Doubleday asked his commander, “Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancellorsville? Some say you were injured by a shell, and others you were drunk; now tell us what it was.”
Hooker reportedly replied on his performance at Chancellorsville, “Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hooker and that is all there is to it.”
A couple problems with this quote. First, the quote came from Major Eminel P. Halstead, one of Doubleday’s staff. He wrote a letter to John Bigelow Jr. in 1910 for Bigelow’s The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study. However, after Hooker sustained his injury at Chancellorsville, he was never in a position to ride with Doubleday as they followed Lee’s army north on separate paths several miles apart. A myth repeated by many historians since as truth.
One thing about Joe Hooker, while he was fallible, he certainly never lacked for confidence.
What is in a Name?
That is a situation like the often-repeated version of how Hooker got his sobriquet “Fighting Joe Hooker”. In that case, it seems the source begins again with Bigelow Jr. reprinting a letter from Sidney V. Lowell. Lowell, in 1903, claimed responsibility for a newspaper error producing the nickname. During the fighting around Richmond in 1862 where Hooker, now elevated to corps command, found himself involved in heavy fighting.
The last page forms for the New York Courier and Enquirer were being prepared just as another dispatch came in with “Fighting – Joe Hooker” written on top. Lowell said he knew this line referred to earlier material but the compositor putting in the type knew nothing about what went on before setting the headline as “Fighting Joe Hooker”. Lowell thought it made a good headline and let it go realizing Hooker would gain a new persona. Robert E. Lee liked to describe his opponent as “Mr. F. J. Hooker”.
A problem with Lowell’s memory is the compositor worked with the New York Courier and Enquirer. By 1862, that newspaper belonged to the New York World. The World has no mention of the nickname anywhere until after the Peninsula Campaign. “Fighting Joe” seems to have evolved from the men fighting in his division. Several sources from men within his division after the battle of Williamsburg described their general as “Fighting Joe Hooker” with the usage predating any headline typos.
“It is all Poetry”
A later myth concerning Hooker repeated by many historians is Grant’s supposed opinion of the importance of the Battle of Lookout Mountain the day before the decisive Federal storming of Missionary Ridge at Chattanooga. Grant supposedly wrote in his memoirs, “The battle of Lookout Mountain is one of the romances of the war. There was no such battle and no action even worthy to be called the battle on Lookout Mountain. It is all poetry.” However, the line does not appear anyhere in his Memoirs. There he describes the handling of Hooker’s command on Lookout Mountain as “brilliant”. He also characterizes Hooker as overly ambitious and self absorbed. The source of the quote is actually from a newspaper interview Grant gave in the Chicago Tribune 27 July 1878.
WEST POINT, MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA
Hooker, like many of his colleagues in the command structure of the Army of the Potomac, was a West Pointer, class of 1837. Fellow classmates included eight brigadier generals on the Federal side and five other major generals besides Hooker, including men like John Sedgwick and William Henry French. On the Confederate side, Braxton Bragg, Jubal A. Early, William H. T. Walker and John C. Pemberton graduated with Hooker. Many of those men fought in Mexico alongside Hooker.
After the Mexican War, the army posted Captain Hooker to California where he shared a house with Brigadier General Persifor Smith, Major Philip Kearney, and Captain George Stoneman. The man in California Hooker relieved was Lieutenant William T. Sherman. Hooker, like several other officers posted to California, left the service – officially in 1853 – for better or worse.
Also, like many other fellow officers on the frontier, Hooker seems to try to cure his boredom with some drinking and time at the card tables. Before the Mexican War, he did not drink, but that changed a bit in California, one officer noting Hooker was “going to the dogs.”. He tried his hand at ranching though the main source of his income came from the cutting of cordwood from his property. Towards the end of the 1850s, he finally found more purpose becoming the Superintendent of Military Roads in Oregon, probably the result of Democratic political patronage in California.
RETURN TO THE EAST
Cartoon describing row between Winfield Scott wielding the sword of “Truth” and Gideon Pillow blowing up the bag.
With the onset of the Civil War, Hooker, through a friend’s help, came East to try to regain a position in the army, running into problems initially with army commander Winfield Scott. Hooker had been a part of the staff of Gideon Pillow in Mexico. Scott and Pillow had involved themselves in a big fight resulting in a court martial trial for Pillow. Hooker got called as a witness for his immediate commander. While he said nothing bad about Scott, just by appearing, he went into Scott’s black book, especially with Pillow exonerated by the court.
Hooker was an inveterate letter writer and persuasive in person. It took until after the battle of First Manassas, but his campaign for a position succeeded. That success especially helped after a meeting with President Lincoln, himself, who came away impressed with Hooker.
Federal generals painted on the front of a tobacco pouch – McClellan is in the center with Hooker to his left and Burnside is to Hooker’s left.
Library of Congress
Receiving a commission as a brigadier general 3 August 1861 set him up to help McClellan re-organize what became the Army of the Potomac. He went on to become a divisional and eventually corps commander during the Peninsula Campaign and the battles of Second Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. As a commander, he was respected and liked by his men and peers – at least some of those peers.
After McClellan failed to follow up the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln relieved him. He wanted to place Hooker in his place – Hooker certainly pushed for such an appointment – but found himself overruled by both Henry Halleck, whom Lincoln recently installed as the overall Union commander, and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who wanted William Rosecrans for the job. Neither Stanton nor Halleck liked Hooker but this time Lincoln stood his ground.
REORGANIZATION
After Burnside. Hooker’s first job was to reorganize the Army of the Potomac which he managed in short order providing fresh food to troops, instituted furloughs, re-instilled discipline, re-organized army structure and vastly improved morale. A few short months after the fiasco at Fredericksburg, the army was once again ready to take the field.
CHANCELLORSVILLE
Initial Plans
Halleck – in true Halleck-fashion – let Hooker decide how best to plan for a spring campaign. Hooker and his staff came up with a promising plan that was probably a bit over ambitious, especially with regard to the new cavalry corps Hooker instituted. The plan called for almost 10,000 men under his old roommate, George Stoneman, to ride deep behind Lee’s army to penetrate lines of communication. Only a sole brigade of cavalry remained with the main army.
The second part of the plan was for former classmate John Sedgwick to use his reinforced 6th Corps along with the 1st and 3rd Corps to fix Lee on his defenses at Fredericksburg through demonstrations. The rest of the army would go with Hooker crossing the Rappahannock to the west and establish a defensive position forcing Lee to fight against forces on two sides or retreat towards Richmond.
BEST LAID PLANS …
Rains forced a delay for Stoneman until the main force crossed at Kelly’s Ford on 29 April with the 5th, 11th and 12th Corps crossing over pontoon bridges put across. The following day, Hooker sent the larger part of the rest of the army crossing the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely’s Fords pushing on to the crossroads of Chancellorsville. Hooker’s moves were quickly noted by Confederate forces letting Lee become aware of what Mr. F. J. Hooker was up to. Despite that, the Army of the Potomac seemed to be setting up according to plan. When the 1st and 3rd Corps arrived on 1 May, Hooker directed his men out in three directions to pin Lee down.
The plan was to establish a strong defensive line along the ridge running from Bank’s Ford to Salem Church. George Meade’s 5th Corps moved along the River Road to the north; Henry Slocum’s 12th Corps marched to the south along the Orange Plank Road while the 2nd Division of Meade’s corps – men of George Sykes – marched centrally up the Orange Turnpike Road.
To counter the Federal moves, Lee sent Richard Anderson to install trenches atop the Zoan Church ridge. Stonewall Jackson soon arrived, and a new plan hatched. Lafayette McLaw’s division went south down the Orange Plank Road in an attempt to flank the Federals of Sykes’ division. Several hours of fighting occurred after which Hooker ordered a withdrawal back to Chancellorsville to form a defensive perimeter there.
THREE QUESTIONS
Number One – Pull back to Chancellorsville
A 2019 study by Major Matthew S. Hall, USMC, in partial fulfillment of requirements for a master’s degree in military studies, Wrote Hooker’s Logical Decisions. He focuses on three aspects at the Battle of Chancellorsville for which others castigated Hooker for after the fact. The first question Hall works on is Hooker’s pullback. Many Federals felt frustrated by retreat before the battle had really started. Meade, for example, complained, “My God, if we can’t hold the top of the hill, we certainly can’t hold the bottom of it.”
Hooker did not expect Lee to respond as quickly as he did. With Sykes and the 12th Corps coming into contact with an enemy underestimated in strength, Hooker had to decide if the ground atop the ridge was better than what he already had at the crossroads.
The main problem is Sykes ran into Jackson and Sedgwick was doing little to keep Lee’s attention centered at Fredericksburg. With two corps moving towards him, no thanks to Sedgwick, Hooker had to scramble to change plans.
PULL BACK OR DEFEAT IN DETAIL
The Confederates reached the high ground around Zoan Church first. They were also there in greater numbers than anticipated. The element of surprise gone, possibly the entire Rebel force reaching west in response. The wooded ground also meant Sykes was on his own without support from Meade or Slocum. Hooker had planned on a defensive fight here at Chancellorsville with Lee attacking him on favorable grounds. Pulling Sykes back made sense ending an offensive unsupported attack in unfavorable ground. Instead of having his three columns fighting separate battles – River Road, Orange Plank and Orange Turnpike – the Army of Potomac could concentrate. Hall points out Meade was frustrated because he saw his men moving quickly down the River Road to secure Bank’s Ford and link the two wings of the army together. What he did not see is what was happening to the south which Hooker did see.
Darius Couch
Darius Couch commanded the 2nd Corps. He was a West point – class of 1846 with Goerge Stoneman, George McClellan, Stonewall Jackson, Jesse Reno, George Pickett, Cadmus Wilcox and John Gibbon. He graduated just in time to see service with the artillery in Mexico. Following five years of garrison duty, he took a sabbatical from the army to serve on a scientific mission for the Smithsonian Institute in northern Mexico. Besides discovering several new species, he also developed chronic dysentery which was a problem for the rest of his life.
Like many of his brother officers, Couch resigned from the army – 1855 – but with the onset of the Civil War, he became the colonel of the 7th Massachusetts 15 June 1861 soon moving up to brigade command as a brigadier in August with an effective backdate – like Hooker – to 17 May. Moving from brigade command in the fall to divisional command in the 6th Corps in spring 1862, Couch led his division throughout the Peninsula Campaign until his health began to fail and he asked McClellan to let him resign.
Little Mac refused and made him a major general instead. Involved in the Maryland Campaign, Couch was curiously absent from Antietam. He was in the thick of things at Fredericksburg where his 2nd Corps took the worst of things losing over 4,000 casualties. Couch remained in command of the 2nd Corps at Chancellorsville. He was also the senior corps commander, meaning he was second in line for overall command if something happened up top.
COUCH AT CHANCELLORSVILLE
Couch had sent the division of Winfield Scott Hancock forward to help Sykes. However, by the time Hancock arrived, Sykes was already withdrawing. Couch realized Hancock would have to do so, likewise. Couch was not a happy man, “to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets, was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man.” The problem was, by the time Couch could have brought up the rest of his corps, Sykes and Slocum could have been off the field.
When an army stands dispersed, it is vulnerable. Similar cases in the Civil War occurred throughout – the Maryland Campaign (Lee’s army) and the Chickamauga Campaign (Rosecrans’ army) two great examples. Here, Hooker’s forces stood dispersed, albeit on purpose, with a central consolidated Confederate foe. Hooker wanted to force Lee into attacking, so it was Lee’s move next.
The Right Flank
By the morning of 2 May, Hooker’s army was ready for Lee’s attack – from the east. Of course, Stonewall Jackson had other plans. Hooker thought Lee was retreating from Chancellorsville but took efforts to safeguard his flanks. He knew there was little in the way of enemy at Fredericksburg by now. Since Sedgwick had done little in the way of demonstrating, he was told to stay where he was and protect the supply lines, freeing up John Reynolds 1st Corps to join Hooker. Further influencing Hooker that Lee was retreating, Jackson was careful in choosing roads leading south for his flank attack. Hooker discounted the idea Lee was dividing his forces in the face of a superior force.
He also knew his right flank stood not strongly defended. Reports kept coming in that maybe the Confederates were not running away, however, and he suggested to both Slocum and O. O. Howard – 11th Corps – to watch out for their flanks and keep heavy reserves on hand, just in case. Lack of defenses thrown up on the right and “a scarcity of troops at that point” appeared to Hooker that they also were not posted “as favorably as might be”.
Howard’s failure
Howard already thought the enemy was retreating. He sent the brigade of Francis Barlow forward to Catherine’s Furnace to chase after Jackson. Hooker was aware of the vulnerable right flank and pointed it out to Howard as did others of his staff. Howard felt convinced Jackson was retreating. General Alexander Schimmelfinnig reported of a buildup on the right, but Howard smiled telling Schimmelfinnig’s aide to tell his general to stop reconnoitering and hold his position. Howard was convinced the forest was impenetrable and did not want to move his men so they could face the west. The success of the flank attack lay on Howard’s failure alone.
Hooker formed a new defensive line around Chancellorsville after Jackson’s attack routed the 11th Corps. He stemmed the rout putting Hiram Berry’s 3rd Corps into the breach to settle the line. There were also plans about to try and flank Jackson’s flankers. Hooker still hoped to turn the battle around at the end of the night of 2 May. Sedgwick was to attack and fall on Lee’s rear while the rest of the Federal forces arrayed around Chancellorsville settled down to defend against expected Confederate attacks the next day.
Hazel Grove
The giving up of high ground at Hazel Grove by Daniel Sickles 3rd Corps was thought by Confederate artillery commander Porter Alexander to have “rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battle-field”. However, with the success of Jackson’s flank attack the night before, the 3rd Corps was dangerously placed in a position where they could be pinched off. And while giving the Confederate artillerists the slightly higher ground from which they could fire shells down the flanks of the Federals, Hooker was also making plans to create a new defensive line. Sedgwick was expected to attack, as well, so Hooker did not want to lose more men trying to hold onto Hazel Grove.
With the 1st and 5th Corps set to the north, Hooker was still waiting for the Confederates to tire themselves fighting against the three corps of Sickles Slocum and Couch arrayed around the Chancellor House. One flank attack through the Wilderness could have led to another.
And here is where fate set in for Joseph Hooker.
DOWN AND ALMOST OUT
With the action blazing all around Hooker and his staff at his headquarters at the Chancellor House, at about 0900, Hooker stepped away from a porch pillar he had been leaning on. He leant down to take a written report from Major H. Edwin Tremain from Sickles’ staff requesting reinforcement. A cannonball slammed into the post upon which he had leaned splitting it lengthwise throwing it “violently against me” knocking him to the ground. Those around him thought he was dead at first. He lay unconscious for a half hour or more attended to by his chief medical director Major Dr. Jonathan Letterman. The doctor doubted Hooker would live.
But Hooker did. Waking up slowly and with difficulty, he mounted a horse to show he was still alive. Couch had heard of Hooker’s wounding and rode quickly over since, as senior corps commander, he was second-in-command. “If he was killed, what shall I do with the disjointed army?” Couch wrote years later. Finding Hooker mounted, Couch congratulated him on his recovery and rushed to rejoin his corps.
Just after Couch left, Hooker had to dismount because of pain and dizziness. Vomiting after he dismounted, he lay for a short while on “a blanket spread out on the ground, and was given some brandy. This revived me, and I was assisted to remount”. The blanket became a target for another Confederate round just moments later pushing Hooker and his staff to withdraw further to the rear.
Retreat
Couch was requested to return to Hooker around 1000. Riding past the now blazing Chancellor House to Hooker’s new command post about a half mile back. Meade also stood present hoping to get orders for his corps to enter the fray. Couch recalled, “General Hooker was lying down I think in a soldier’s tent by himself. Raising himself a little as I entered, he said, ‘Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You will withdraw it and place it in the position designated on the map,’ as he pointed to a line traced on a field-sketch … He seemed rather dull, but possessed of his mental facilities.”
Meade also wrote, “Hooker never lost his head, nor did he ever allow himself to be influenced by me or my advice.” This was in response to Meade seeking permission to bring his and Reynolds’ 1st Corps – 30,000+ soldiers standing on the side until this moment – into the battle.
compos mentis?
Those closer to Hooker noticed all was not right with their commander. Captain William L. Candler wrote, “The blow which the General received seems to have knocked all the sense from him. For the remainder of the day he was wandering, and unable to get any ideas into his head … in fact, in no time of the trip after Sunday did he seem to be compos mentis (of sound mind).”
Leaving Hooker with his new orders, Couch met with Meade and Colonel Nelson H. Davis – his assistant Inspector General – who said, “We shall have some fighting now!” Neither Couch nor Meade wanted to go forward, however, without an express order by Hooker to do so. The only Hooker gave was the order to withdraw. The army was basically leaderless from the moment of Hooker’s trauma. The battle certainly could have changed if the 1st and 5th Corps had been sent into the fray, especially on the left flank of Jackson’s – now under the command of J. E. B. Stuart – men.
ONWARD
The results of his concussion still seem present when Hooker recrossed the river on 6 May. Candler wrote, “It was so different from his former acts … leaving everything to his corps commanders” as Hooker was one of the first to cross immediately after conducting a conference with those men. Asking for their advice, two chose retreat, three were for continuing the attack. Hooker took responsibility for then ordering a retreat back across the Rappahannock. Reynolds exclaimed in disgust, “What was the use of calling us together at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?”
Hooker remained in command of the Army of the Potomac after Chancellorsville for a little over a month longer as both armies marched to the north to come together for the three-day tumble at Gettysburg. George Meade would lead the Army of the Potomac in that struggle. Halleck accepted Hooker’s resignation 27 June after not allowing Hooker to gather up the garrison at Harpers Ferry as the armies marched north. A couple days after Hooker was gone, the garrison left to join the Federal army, as well. Halleck simply used the excuse to frustrate Hooker enough to resign as chief of the Army of the Potomac, collecting in full any monies Hooker had not paid back in full in California.
gone but not out
Lincoln did not want Hooker gone from the army, however, and sent him south and west a couple months later commanding the 11th and 12th Corps sent to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga after their defeat at Chickamauga. Hooker led his men – reconstituted later as the 20th Corps – both at Chattanooga and through most of the Atlanta campaign. By most accounts, he led them well. When Sherman promoted O. O. Howard over him with the death of James McPherson near the end of July 1864 at Peachtree Creek, Hooker again resigned. Lincoln tried to get Sherman to back down, but Sherman threatened to resign himself. Again, pay off your money debts.
FINALITY
Joseph Hooker resigned from the 20th Corps but still remained in the army. Lincoln sent him to command the Department of the North out of Columbus and then Cincinnati. There, Hooker met his wife-to-be just before suffering the first of several strokes helped on no doubt by his Chancellorsville concussion. Strokes are a big problem with people suffering concussions in the first months afterwards. But they also greatly increase the chances later on, too. People writing the histories of the war in the years following the end of the Civil War ascribed his strokes to his injuries suffered at Chancellorsville. But other authors have accepted the later myths of Hooker losing confidence in himself; or seeming alright after his initial episode on the porch of the Chancellor House.
Hooker was by no means a perfect general, but the victors got to write the stories. Those stories quoted by many historians seem to always repeat stories founded in myth. Or the author has a favorite to put forward – i.e. Grant or Sherman – or they simply do not like Hooker, thinking him a braggart, drunkard, and womanizer. Many of these writers find it easy to pass over the fact that concussions are serious business. There should have been a way to place Hooker on the sideline after his event at Chancellorsville. Couch should have been more forceful taking command. Hooker himself should have confided at least with his corps commanders at Chancellorsville as to his battle plans not keeping them focused simply on their own fronts.
lazy history?
Some authors write the war would have shortened without his concussion. That might be stretching it a bit. The battle was not lost early on 3 May. It might have gone on with great results for the Federal side, or not. It is said the Chancellorsville was Lee’s greatest victory and in ways it was. But even Lee realized he could not have many more such “victories” if the South was to win the war. He lost 22% of his force during the battle – the Federals lost 10% – men much more difficult for the manpower poor South to replace. Lee lost more than Stonewall Jackson during the battle, too. Nine of his 28 brigades lost the commanders with three brigades losing multiple men in command. 64 of 130 regimental commanders fell, as well. That would have ramifications early in July.
FURTHER READING
Hebert, Walter H. Fighting Joe Hooker 1944
Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1996
Sears, Stephen W. “In Defense of Fighting Joe Hooker,” Civil War Generals in Defeat 1999
Neely, Jr. Mark E. “Wilderness and the Cult of Manliness: Hooker, Lincoln, and Defeat” in Lincoln’s Generals. Ed. Gabor S. Boritt. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994
Couch, Darius. “The Chancellorsville Campaign.” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Tide Shifts. Vol. 3. Ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel. Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1883.
Bates, Samuel P. “Hooker’s Comments on Chancellorville.” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: The Tide Shifts. Vol. 3. Ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel. Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1883
on the web
The Mayhem & Mystery of May 3: Joseph Hooker and the Battle of Chancellorsville — Civil Discourse (civildiscourse-historyblog.com) – Zac Cowsert West Virginia University doctoral student
https://archive.org/details/campaignofchance00lcbige – Bigelow, John Campaign of Chancellorsville 1910
neurosurg-focus-article-pE4 (1).pdf – The crippled brain that prolonged the Civil War: General Joseph Hooker’s concussions at Chancellorsville T. Glenn Pait, MD and Matthew Helton, MD 2022
hooker.pdf – Major Matthew S. Hall, USMC. Hooker’s Logical Decisions 2019
Emerging Civil War – Joe and the Illini: The Unclear Origins of Two “Fighting” Nicknames – Alexander, Edward 2020